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Humanistic redesign and technological politics in organisations
Richard Badham, Karin Garrety, Christina Kirsch
The political nature of technology design and implementation is explicitly addressed in human centered 
projects to introduce technologies that support job enrichment, group anatomy and industrial democracy. 
Yet the political meaning of such projects does not simply manifest itself in pure form from the methods 
employed or the intentions of the humanistic actors but, rather, from the complex configuration of these and 
other factors present in the design and implementation context. This paper illustrates this theme in an
analysis of a case study human centered project. It argues that an improved understanding of the 
configurational politics surrounding such projects is not only an important research area but is also of
practical significance in improving humanistic and other interventions in innovation processes in modern
organizations.
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1. Introduction 
Technologies introduced into modern organisations are political in both their origins and effects. They are 
socially shaped and constructed before and during the process of implementation. They also have an
impact that affects the distribution of power and rewards in organisations (Badham, 1991). Recognising this 
political dimension of technology, a number of researchers and activists have sought to intervene in 
technology design and implementation to promote more "humanistic" forms of technology. These "human
centred", "skill based" or "work oriented" technologies are explicitly designed and implemented to enhance 
the quality of working life of all employees and promote more participatory forms of job design and work
organisation (Badham, 1992). For some, such initiatives are harbingers of a new humane world of work, for 
others, however, they are more superficial and illusory in character, often hiding rather than transforming a 
more authoritarian technic (Ebel, 1990). 
As we have argued elsewhere, the character of such initiatives is more complex and contradictory than 
such one-dimensional interpretations imply (Garrety and Badham, 2000). Rather than viewing such
projects through the simple lens of grand narratives of work humanisation or managerial domination, more 
attention needs to be paid to the form that such projects take in particular political and organisational
contexts. Yet, with some notable exceptions (Gillespie, 1993), there have been surprisingly few detailed
studies of such projects. The purpose of the present paper is to add to our understanding of such initiatives 
through a case study analysis of one humanistic project to intervene in the piloting and design of a leading 
edge "intelligent" manufacturing system. In order to improve our understanding of the complex and detailed 
politics involved in shaping workplace technologies, this study will draw on and further develop a 
"configurational process" model of workplace innovation that has been elaborated in more detail elsewhere
(McLoughlin et al., 2000). This model was developed to help understand and explore the politics of post-
adoption innovation, but is extended here to help conceptualise the complex politics of technology design.
Following the case study analysis, the paper will draw out the implications of the analysis for our 
understanding of the political nature of workplace technology design and implementation. 
2. The case study: a technology trial and its socio-technical risks 
During the mid-1990s, a group of technologists working in the R&D division of a large Australian company
developed what they called an intelligent manufacturing system (IMS). The system consisted of several
interlinked computers that could be used to fine-tune a continuous manufacturing process. The units were
designed to gather information from several points along the process - for example, the temperature, speed 
and pressure of various sections of the machinery carrying out the process. The computers could 
communicate with each other, and produce a set of optimal equipment settings. In this way, each piece of 
equipment could be finely tuned to take the overall state of the process into account. If one machine was
exhibiting signs of wear, for instance, the others could be adjusted to compensate.
In 1996, the developers were ready to trial the IMS in an actual manufacturing site. They chose a factory
within their company, and carried out a risk review workshop at corporate headquarters. Many possible 
risks were listed. Under the category of "human factors risks", participants at the workshop identified the 
following possibilities: 
- that the IMS "will not be simple enough for staff to handle"; 
- that its "continued use [would lead to] operator deskilling"; and  
- that there would be "inadequate preparation of end-users".  
After the workshop, the technology developers summarised these concerns into a single statement of risk - 
that "end-users do not adopt the technology". It was to address this risk that the technology developers 
engaged the services of a group of socio-technical experts[1]. Over the next few months, these experts 
negotiated a contract with the company, which stated that their main task would be "to reduce the risks of 
user opposition or lack of involvement" in the forthcoming trial. To this end, they had to ensure that the 
equipment was "useable" and that operators "accepted" the need for the trial. At the same time, however, 
the socio-technical specialists were mandated to apply and evaluate "leading edge human factors and 
organisational methodologies". It was this mandate that provided the opportunity to carry out the research 
reported in this paper. As outlined in more detail elsewhere (Garrety and Badham, 2000), the case study 
has the advantage of drawing on the insight and involvement of action researchers but combined this with 
observations and interview data obtained from an ethnographic researcher with no "active" role to play in 
the project (Badham et al., 1995). 
3. The socio-technical experts and their tools 
While the company technologists initially perceived the socio-technical project as a matter of assisting in the 
implementation of the IMS trial, the Australian socio-technical research team identified the project as a 
major opportunity to trial advanced socio-technical methods for intervening in the technology design. 
Although they were effectively locked out of the initial design of the IMS prototype, they were in a position to 
facilitate users and developers in a critical evaluation of it. This would involve making recommendations 
about the human/machine interface and the allocation of functions between humans and technology. Users 
would also be encouraged to explore job design issues relevant to the future development of the IMS 
technology within the company. 
The socio-technical team leader set about organising the project. The details will be outlined later in the 
paper. In this section, we introduce the major socio-technical tools - or, as the contract would have it, the 
"leading edge human factors and organisational methodologies" - around which the intervention was 
organised. To aid the credibility of socio-technical design as a practice, and to supplement the Australian 
expertise, overseas experts were flown in and employed to carry out a series of workshops near the IMS 
test site in late 1997 and early 1998. The tools and techniques used in these workshops reflected the 
professional backgrounds and interests of the experts. A US socio-technical researcher/practitioner acted 
as a facilitator at the first workshop, bringing to it a strong focus on group discussion and breakout 
techniques. US socio-technical design principles, however, were placed in the background so that two other 
tools could be highlighted - a Scandinavian "envisionment" approach, and a Swiss "allocation of functions" 
methodology. The former is based on a "collective resource" approach to technology design, which explicitly 
creates a space for worker/user control of the process. In so-called "future workshops" potential users are 
invited to speculate and even fantasise about their ideal workplace. Metaphors and games are used to 
stimulate the users' imagination, in exercises described as "design by doing" and "design by playing". They 
may also build cardboard mock-ups and prototypes. The overall aim is to generate ideas that are not 
constrained by perceptions of what is and is not "practical", and to create a design process that is 
meaningful and enjoyable. The next stage, with the assistance of technology developers, is to refine those 
ideas, select the most feasible and desirable, and to turn them into tangible objects (Ehn, 1988; Greenbaum 
and Kyng, 1991). 
The Swiss allocation of functions (AOF) method is much more highly structured than the loose, imaginative 
envisionment approach. It is relatively new, and because of its structured nature, has the possibility to 
provide concrete tangible outcomes. Because of these factors, the socio-technical experts decided that this 
approach would be the major socio-technical tool employed during the intervention. AOF is a normative 
framework drawing on socio-technical systems design principles combined with action regulation/activity 
theory. It operationalises a set of norms and principles drawn from this theory into specific design criteria 
(Grote et al., 1996). The method was specifically developed in response to critiques of socio-technical 
theory that claimed that it has failed to develop specific criteria for technology design and development. It 
also addresses concerns raised by people interested in human/computer interaction and ergonomics. 
These critics claim that human factors issues have been relegated to secondary interface design when they 
should have a more primary role in determining system functionality. The AOF method integrates an 
analysis and set of principles for the human-machine system with compatible analyses and principles of the 
work tasks of the human operator and the work system. 
The method has traditionally been applied in two workshops, each lasting two days, supported by expert 
psychological analysis of the work tasks and work system in the production area in which the technology is 
being designed to operate. The objective of the first workshop is to shift the attention of developers and 
users away from a "technology centred" focus on the development of the technology and its impacts 
towards a "work-oriented" focus on production requirements and their associated human and organisational 
needs, so that the technology can be shaped with those needs and requirements in mind. It promotes work-
oriented design concepts that place job enrichment, individual and group autonomy, and organisational 
autonomy and flexibility at the centre of prospective organisational design. These concepts are promoted at 
the level of corporate strategy, interdepartmental relations, work groups and job design as well as in the 
allocation of functions between humans and machines and the design of human/machine interfaces. The 
purpose of the first workshop is to introduce this perspective to both users and developers, persuade them 
of its value, introduce the basic allocation of function principles and obtain some common understanding 
and agreement on the socio-technical character of the work system into which the technology is to be 
introduced. The objective of the second workshop is to take users and developers through a systematic 
process of deciding the appropriate allocation of functions between operators and technology in the new 
system according to the specified criteria. Detailed "work packages" are created, that define for the 
developers the user requirements for the new technology. 
4. The configuration-process model of tool use in process design  
As we noted above, our primary aim in this paper is to document and explore the detailed politics 
surrounding the design of workplace technologies. In this case study the focus is on the form taken by the 
project to apply a generic socio-technical method or tool to create a more "human centred" workplace 
technology, i.e. a technology that places humans rather than technology at the "centre" of the production 
process (Badham, 1991). Before launching into our case study, we briefly introduce a conceptual model for 
analysing the case study - a model that we believe is useful for appreciating and understanding the details 
of such processes. The model was initially developed to capture the complex processes associated with the 
introduction and operation of new production systems (Badham, 1995; Badham et al., 1997). Such 
operations involve the mutual configuration of three organisational elements: 
(1) intrapreneurs; 
(2) operators; and  
(3) the technology itself. 
This is so that they can transform relevant inputs into outputs in a specific organisational environment, 
which is in turn shaped by broader social, economic and political contexts. In the present paper, the socio-
technical tools themselves constitute the relevant technological element, the "operators" are the users of the 
socio-technical tools, and the intrepreneurs are the socio-technical project managers, as well as any other 
actors (factory supervisors, technicians, human resource personnel, etc.) involved in initiating and 
supporting the project as it unfolds. Inputs into the configurational process include the socio-technical 
systems on which the tools are to be "used", plus other sundry resources such as project funding, rather 
than the raw materials of production. The output would be a socio-technical (re)-design rather than a 
manufactured product. The model is presented in diagrammatic form in Figure 1, below. 
Within this configurational-process model, socio-technical practitioners, in order to effectively influence the 
design of technologies, are inevitably involved in identifying and addressing the complex, contingent and 
political character of their work. The nature and effect of generic socio-technical technologies and 
techniques, or of given operators and users of such techniques, cannot be understood in isolation from the 
local processes of "making out". In these processes, technologies and people are welded together into 
workable systems by "intrapreneurs" who obtain resources, exert discipline and work across boundaries to 
ensure the operation, survival and development of such systems. Key macro events and broader power 
relations and structures can also have impacts on the development of configurations. Tools, operators and 
intrapreneurs may be influenced by the profitability of the relevant organisation or organisations, or 
changing knowledge and career structures. While the influences on particular elements of the configuration 
may overlap, it is clear that tool or technology configurations may by influenced by national R&D policies, 
international technology and professional associations. User configurations may be linked to internal and 
external labour markets, education and training institutions, and local work cultures. Configurational 
intrepreneurs are directly affected by their own labour markets, intrapreneurial culture and professional 
associations, product markets, as well as the objectives, structure and resources of the organisation. 
Further details of the model are explained and illustrated in the case study below. 
5. The IMS socio-technical project - applying the configurational-process approach 
The configuration-process approach provides a framework within which to examine the complex political 
processes involved in socio-technical work. As far as possible, we tell the story of what happened in the 
IMS project through the categories contained within the model - the technology itself (in the case, the socio-
technical tools), the intrapreneurs (the socio-technical experts and their allies in the company) and the 
operators (the people in the company invited to make the tools part of their ongoing work). These 
categories do, of course, intertwine. Indeed, the intertwinement - or mutual configuration of technology, 
intrapreneurs and operators - is a major feature of the configurational model. Highlighting each category in 
turn, however, enables us to impose some order on our analysis. It also helps us to draw out and make 
explicit the factors contributing to the complexity of the process itself. 
5.1 The technology - configuring the socio-technical tools 
Technological configurations are the specific constellations of knowledge, equipment and procedures that 
make up the structured, material, technical, non-human elements of a design or production process. In 
contrast to more traditional views of technology and methods or techniques, the concept of technological 
configuration points to the loosely systemic, complex and locally-constituted character of conceptual or 
material tools. In the case of socio-technical design techniques, this involves, for example, combining 
different formal design methodologies with varying group process techniques in different sets of facilities 
(with different audiovisual equipment, rooms, seating and so on). Tool configuration is also an iterative, 
recursive process, that involves taking into account the various meanings or interpretations that develop 
with regard to the tool as configuration proceeds.  
It is clear from the configurational-process model that the use of tools requires much more than just a 
simple, unproblematic "application". In the IMS project, a major influence on the configuration process was 
the "input" into the system - the experimental technology to which the socio-technical tools were to be 
applied. In the past, the Swiss AOF method had been applied to technologies that were specifically 
developed or introduced for use in particular contexts. They were usually isolated human-machine systems 
of the sort used in batch manufacturing. The IMS, by contrast, was an experimental prototype designed to 
span and fine-tune a continuous process. The nature of the work system under investigation was, therefore, 
much more difficult to define. The somewhat amorphous nature of technology created problems for the 
socio-technical experts. Pre-workshop discussions were long and tortuous, as they struggled to define the 
"primary task" of the work system to which their conceptual tools would apply. There was a general lack of 
clarity and continuing disagreement over whether the socio-technical tools should be applied to the 
technology itself, or to the total work system, the latter requiring a broader focus on the purpose and 
boundaries of the plant as a whole. The final decision to focus on the plant as a whole was an outcome of 
the group's failure to resolve the issue to everyone's satisfaction. In the view of the Australian project leader, 
if the facilitators disagreed about this, the users and developers were likely to become hopelessly confused, 
with disastrous consequences for the whole socio-technical project. This interpretation was confirmed when 
the technical project leader in the plant responded to a first introduction to the AOF method by expressing 
concern about the concept of primary task and the confusion that it would most likely create. As the first 
workshop deliberately aims to inculcate the method's philosophy and introduce everyone to its associated 
expert language, any possible confusion could pose major problems for the effective use and transfer of the 
method. There was an initial inability to "translate" the method's categories in a way that "made sense" to 
other facilitators and user representatives. This may have been due to a clash between socio-technical 
methodologies, a misunderstanding due to national language differences or an inability of the different 
participants to explain themselves or listen effectively. There may also have been genuine ambiguity in the 
method's concepts, reflecting either their origin in batch production, or the study of particular workplaces. 
The end result, however, was that the first workshop was modified to address the overall goals of the plant - 
an adaptation of the tool that enabled the workshop to go ahead in the Australian context. This, in 
combination with the brief time allocated to the method experts to carry out the project, made the attempt to 
use the method to come up with precise recommendations far more complicated and difficult than had been 
the case in previous projects. 
In addition, tool use, as represented by the workshop processes and activities, was influenced by the 
different group facilitation philosophies and techniques of the socio-technical researchers. There was a 
complex amalgam of US group discussion and breakout techniques (strongly influential in the first 
workshop), Swedish "envisionment" techniques (having a significant impact on the second workshop) and 
Swiss socio-technical analysis, philosophy and design principles. Moreover, the structure and conduct of 
the workshops was also influenced by the character and perceived character of the participants. Compared 
to user participants in Switzerland, the Australians were generally more critical of expert authority, and more 
prone to joking and taking a relaxed view of the tasks presented to them. These characteristics had a 
particularly strong effect on the second workshop. 
Usually the second workshop in an application of the Swiss AOF tool consists of a lengthy and stressful 
attempt by the participants to create a number of detailed work packages for the technology developers. In 
the Australian project, other tasks and outcomes were given priority. A number of participatory "design by 
doing" and "design by playing" exercises inspired by the Scandinavian "envisionment" approach were 
employed. The workshop ended with the establishment of a project implementation team within the plant 
that was given responsibility for the further application and use of socio-technical tools during the IMS trial 
and, hopefully, beyond. These variations had both positive and negative outcomes. On the one hand, the 
envisionment exercises increased the interest and enjoyment of the participants, both users and 
developers, and avoided the frustration and difficulties involved in the application of numerous complex 
design criteria to the creation of specific work packages. It also allowed the workshops to achieve the 
objective desired by the plant manager: the creation of an informed and motivated user team. On the other 
hand, there were no detailed work packages that could be handed on to the designers and, as 
subsequently proved to be the case, there was a danger that the user team and developers would not get 
together later to carry out the hard work necessary to effectively reshape the technology in line with the 
method's criteria. 
Finally, the application of the method was affected by its use in a project that had been primarily negotiated 
by Australian configurational-intrapreneurs (plant management, developer project management, socio-
technical research group head) and, in addition to its use as an expert guide to the redesign of the 
technology, it was also deliberately used as a means for improving user-developer relations, and as a 
means for improving the skills, motivation and resources of the users more generally - a factor that also had 
an influence on the general conduct of the workshops where the introductory consensus building aspects of 
the exercise were given priority over achieving expert method generated technology design results. This 
interacted strongly with the differences in technology and group facilitation styles in shifting the focus and 
method of conducting the two workshops. 
5.2 The operators 
Operator configurations are made up of the local set of personnel who operate or use the design or 
operations techniques, and their skills, attitudes, interests and roles. In our case study, the relevant 
operators included the expert facilitators who communicated and applied the socio-technical tools, the 
company technology developers and the plant personnel whose activities were structured by the tools. 
Each of the groups involved in the application of socio-technical design methods brings with them a set of 
skills, cultural interpretations and interests, and operates within specific organisational structures with 
attendant rewards and sanctions. However, the actions of these groups cannot be "read off" from their prior 
characteristics. The everyday techno-organisational configuration process shapes them through the 
interactions between the expectations and demands imposed on them by the technological configuration, 
the configurational intrapreneurs, themselves and other operators, as well as the characteristics that they 
bring to the configurational process from outside. 
5.2.1 Tool operators I - socio-technical experts and facilitators 
Among the socio-technical team, the different philosophies and methodologies of the US socio-technical 
consultant, the Swedish participatory designer, the Swiss method facilitator and the Australian socio-
technical team leader all had an influence on how the tools were adapted and applied. The US 
researcher/consultant was responsible for focusing much of the first workshop on a well organised run 
through of the socio-technical system of the whole plant. The Swedish participatory designer was very 
influential in promoting the use of more enjoyable games, role plays and metaphorical exercises. The Swiss 
method facilitator set a high moral tone for the intervention, combining humour with serious commitment, 
and effectively convinced participants of the expert status of the Swiss method and activities. The Australian 
team leader had a strong impact on the overall process, acting to ensure that the workshops occurred in a 
such a way that the different participants, particularly operators and plant management, felt involved, and 
that the needs of the various stakeholder participants in the workshop were addressed. Speculation on 
individual personalities and national characteristics was clearly of interest to participants and occurred 
during the project. There was more or less frequent banter about "Swiss" rigidity in sticking to methods and 
belief in expert status and "Australian" laxity in sticking with agendas and lack of respect for professional 
expertise. 
On a more serious note, tool configuration was also influenced by the professional affiliations, interests and 
roles of the participating socio-technical experts. The issue of whether or not an effective intervention 
should be focused on creating an "expert language" or not, and whether the expertise of the socio-technical 
facilitator is primarily as a "process expert" (bringing together the different participants and their knowledge 
and interests) or a "content expert" (advising on the work psychology criteria that the technology should 
address), underlay a number of these differences in emphasis and was a source of tension that was not 
resolved during the project. The existence of conflicting "paradigms of practice" among applied social 
scientists involved in socio-technical projects has often been observed (Blackler and Shimmin, 1984). 
Pettigrew (1976), in a discussion of internal social scientific redesign agents, observed that a "major source 
of internal consultant ineffectiveness stems from ... (this) ... apparent inability to present a unified political 
force within their organisation in dealings with clients. Often major differences in values, work style and 
career interests disrupt consultancy units and leave clients bewildered about the range and quality of 
service they can expect (Pettigrew, 1976, p. 193). 
5.2.2 Tool operators II - company personnel 
As mentioned earlier, the Swiss AOF tool had previously been used in groups dominated by technology 
developers, with a few high-level user representatives also in attendance. In the IMS project, the workshops 
were mostly attended by operational personnel from the test site, including production, maintenance and 
pulpit control. The technology developers attended some of the proceedings, as did plant management and, 
for a short time, technologists from the IMS equipment manufacturer. As documented in work on 
participatory design, it is often difficult to keep such people interested in development projects when 
activities are structured by expert methodologies and processes (Ehn, 1988). Also, as the plant was being 
used only as a prototype site, both operators and management were sceptical about the value of the 
technology project for their workplace and had to be convinced of the value of the workshops. In this 
context, the workshops had an interestingly ambiguous effect. On the one hand, they were very successful 
in stimulating interest and motivation. The amusing and telling stories used by the Swiss AOF facilitator and 
his clear moral commitment to improving work appealed strongly to the plant personnel, and his critiques of 
traditional "technocentric" models were recognised by the developers and factory workers as reflecting their 
experiences. Moreover, the systematic set of normative criteria embedded within the Swiss tool was seen 
by all groups as a useful checklist and summary of human and organisational issues that should be 
addressed. The workshops therefore appeared to focus on relevant issues, and to provide useful tools. 
On the other hand, the method is based on educating well qualified technology developers in a precise 
expert language, which they are then expected to apply to the process of design. In the Australian 
workshops, which were attended by less well qualified personnel, it was clear that the participants only had 
a general understanding of the criteria. They often found the language obscure and unnecessarily jargon 
ridden. One participant joked that one of the design principles introduced in the method "dynamic coupling" 
(used to refer to the degree to which user's actions are determined by the machine) had a very different 
meaning for him. It reminded him of highly active sexual activity!Moreover, the workshops were allowed to 
proceed in a very flexible fashion with the difficult analytic/development tasks devolved onto an innovation 
team for later work. In part this reflected a decision by the socio-technical research team leader, but it also 
resulted from the participants slowing down the workshop process with banter, "smokos" (Australian slang 
for smoking breaks) and general discussion of matters of interest to them. As participation was voluntary, 
and as plant personnel had a history of non-attendance at meetings, the facilitators felt that there could be 
no rigid imposition of unwanted schedules. As a result, facilitators were able to offer little more than a 
general introduction to the tools and the philosophies they embodied, based on role plays and future 
scenarios about the use of the technology, rather than the "hard work" in creating work packages. This led 
the socio-technical researchers to speculate on whether a new approach ought to be adopted to introducing 
Australian company personnel to the methods. In this approach, workshops would be used for introductory 
purposes, and the detailed creation of work packages would be delegated to individuals or sub-groups who 
would report back. Such decisions are clearly influenced not only by the real characteristics of the users of 
the method but also, as in the case in these workshops, by facilitator perceptions of these characteristics. 
6. The intrapreneurs 
Configurational intrapreneurs are included within the model because they play key roles in establishing and 
guiding the configuration, managing its boundaries and ensuring its survival. Personnel carrying out these 
tasks include project managers, line managers, staff officers, union officials and senior executives. 
The application of the socio-technical tools in the IMS project would not have occurred without an ongoing 
supply of resources from intrapreneurs such as the head of the technology development team who 
organised funding and facilities for the project, the plant managers who provided information and the work 
relief necessary for participants to attend, and the Australian socio-technical team leader who mobilised the 
relevant experts and focused their activities in the workshops. The characteristics and activities of the 
various intrapreneurs directly influenced the tool configuration. For example, in past applications of the 
Swiss AOF tool, the expert facilitator had been involved in every stage of the socio-technical project, from 
"selling" the idea to companies, to organising workshops, to helping deliver the work packages. This 
involvement gave him/her a pivotal role in guiding projects, and a rich understanding of the context in which 
the socio-technical tools were to be applied. In the IMS project, however, it was the Australian team leader 
who "sold" the socio-technical principles to the company, and who played a key role in negotiating the 
content and outcomes of the workshops. The AOF expert was relegated to the role of teacher and 
facilitator, with little overall control of the project. This led to some tension because, as we noted above, the 
conditions prevailing in Australia did not necessarily "fit" the assumptions inherent in the AOF tool. One 
episode of tension occurred when factory personnel were asked at the workshops to evaluate the IMS 
according to design criteria provided by the AOF tool. The potential users, who had yet to experience the 
IMS "hands-on", had just heard a very favourable description of it from one of the technology developers. 
Unsurprisingly, they gave it a positive evaluation, one that did not accord with the expectations of the Swiss 
expert, who saw the IMS as potentially deskilling. He expressed his surprise and tried to initiate a critical 
discussion. However, the socio-technical team leader noted that the developers and users were reacting 
strongly against this stance, as it appeared to demonstrate "sour grapes" on the part of the Swiss expert. 
They had been asked to provide the evaluation, they had done so, and now it was being dismissed as being 
"incorrect". In terms of a strict application of the AOF tool, the Swiss facilitator was correct to pursue his 
critical line. However, it threatened the communication and goodwill that was necessary to carry the project 
forward. The socio-technical team leader cut off the discussion. One desired use of the method was 
sacrificed to another. 
Intrapreneurs among the plant managers also shaped the configuration process. First, the technical officer 
in the plant influenced the content of the workshops by ensuring that any exercises carried out in them 
would be clearly identified as applying to "pie in the sky" imaginary and experimental technology, rather 
than the actual material conditions prevailing in the existing plant. Second, the plant manager expressed a 
desire that the outcome of the workshops would be a motivated team ready to act as facilitators in the IMS 
trial. Third, as we see below, the plant manager and his deputy also influenced tool use (or non-use) 
through their general lack of commitment to driving the further activities of the user team beyond the IMS 
trial.
The importance of intrapreneurial activity in keeping projects afloat is demonstrated by events after the IMS 
trial. Six months after the workshops, the socio-technical team leader discovered that, despite their 
expressed commitment to the socio-technical project and its aims, neither the plant manager nor his deputy, 
who was responsible for human resource development, had seen it as centrally important. 
The plant was run by an informal coalition of managers. The newly established user group fitted uneasily 
with this informal structure and, as the plant and production managers had not seen the project as central, 
there had been no attempt to resolve discrepancies, and convene the user team to address socio-technical 
issues associated with the IMSS trial, or other technologies. Intrapreneurial activity among the technology 
developers also fizzled out. The head of the development group was faced with potential closure of the IMS 
project. She had been advised not to continue using the plant as a test site as it was not seen to be 
productive enough for the company. Consequently, despite the existence of a contract with the socio-
technical researchers to continue the project for another two years, plans to involve the socio-technical 
researchers in the further development of the IMS did not come to fruition. The technology project was 
discontinued.
7. Conclusion 
As revealed in the case study, the nature and application of even a purportedly generic method for 
technology design is profoundly influenced by the local context within which it is introduced. The political 
nature and impact of humanistic technology design projects has been shown to be a consequence of 
complex constellations of techniques, users of those techniques and local intrapreneurs. At one level, this 
should make us more cautious about generalising about "the" political meaning of particular methods and 
techniques introduced into the workplace. Depending on the constellation of technical, operator and 
intrapreneurial factors, "human centred" design projects (like other technology design projects) will take a 
different political form and have a different political impact. At another level, it means that an understanding 
of (and effective intervention in) the introduction of such techniques needs to grasp the complex 
configuration of factors involved in the application site. The configurational process model is only one 
possible conceptual model to help researchers and practitioners grapple with this context and understand 
the bricoleuring role of technology design and implementation processes. The politics of technology design 
and technological politics in organisations more broadly is more about "making do" in context than has often 
been recognised in the past, and more case studies and theoretical models are required to increase general 
understanding of how this occurs. The domination of many "human centred" design projects by socially 
minded engineers, ergonomists and work "scientists", and union activists has led to the dominance of 
technocratic and humanistic rhetoric around such projects, and a neglect of the complex politics of making 
do in context. As Mangham (1978, pp. xii/xiv) has observed more generally, "Few organisation development 
consultants are craftsmen. Most of us are tinkers exhibiting some degree of skill but little artistry. Our 
practice runs well ahead of our understanding ..." (Mangham, 1978, pp. xiii/xiv). Or, as Brad Pitt put it more 
dramatically, in the movie The Devil's Own:"If you are not confused, then you don't understand what is 
going on." 
Note
1. The project was conceived and led by the Australian researcher, who also facilitated the second 
workshop. The US researcher acted as workshop facilitator for the first workshop. The Swiss researchers 
introduced the AOF model and ran most of the sessions in the first and second workshops. The Swedish 
researcher ran a number of sessions in the second workshop. 
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